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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
In Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1189 
(2011), the Supreme Court addressed “the circumstances 
under which an employer may be held liable for employment 
discrimination based on the discriminatory animus of an 
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employee who influenced, but did not make, the ultimate 
employment decision.”  Today we consider, in light of Staub, 
whether the City of Philadelphia, the employer at issue, has 
demonstrated that its internal disciplinary review hearing 
severed the causal connection between a supervisor‟s 
retaliatory animus and the employer‟s ultimate employment 
decision to terminate the employee.  The procedural posture 
of this case appears in the margin,
1
 which disposes of the 
                                              
1
This case came to trial as a Title VII claim filed by three 
terminated police officers, William McKenna, his brother 
Michael McKenna, and Raymond Carnation, each of whom 
alleged that they were disciplined in retaliation for protesting 
the discriminatory treatment afforded their African American 
colleagues.  Their cases were consolidated for discovery and 
trial.   
 
The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, specifically that 
William McKenna proved that the discipline he received 
resulting from the comment that “Sergeant Moroney should 
be shot in the head” was retaliatory, that the number of sick 
checks William received was retaliatory, and awarded him 
$3,000,000 in damages; that Michael proved that the pattern 
of conduct against him was retaliatory, and awarded him 
$5,000,000; and that Raymond Carnation proved that the 
pattern of conduct directed against him was retaliatory and 
awarded him $2,000,000.  App. at 753-57. 
 
The District Court applied the compensatory damages cap 
of Title VII to reduce the jury‟s award to $300,000 per 
plaintiff.  In a thorough and well-reasoned 108-page opinion, 
the District Court denied the plaintiffs‟ post-trial motion, 
which challenged, among other things, the Court‟s 
conclusions that: the McKennas had failed to plead their 
wrongful termination claims; the plaintiffs had failed to plead 
claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act 
(“PHRA”); the City had not impliedly consented to try PHRA 
claims; the Court properly imposed the statutory cap of Title 
VII because there were no PHRA claims to absorb the excess 
above the statutory cap; and that the Court had not erred in 
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issues raised in No. 09-3567.  We limit this opinion to the 
issues raised in the City‟s cross-appeal, No. 10-3430. 
 
I. 
 
Ray Carnation, who is Caucasian, worked as a police 
officer in the Philadelphia Police Department until the City of 
Philadelphia terminated him in 1999.  He filed a Complaint 
against the City, asserting that it terminated him in violation 
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e et seq., in retaliation for his opposition to the City‟s 
racially discriminatory treatment of minority officers.  
 
At trial, the evidence established that Carnation 
worked in the 7-squad of the 25th District of the Philadelphia 
Police Department, over which Captain William Colarulo 
assumed command in 1997.  Shortly thereafter, Sergeant John 
Moroney, who had been one of the rotating supervisors of the 
7-squad, was made permanent supervisor.   
                                                                                                     
determining Carnation‟s equity award based on his 
termination.   
 
      On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the District Court‟s 
opinion.  After carefully reviewing the parties‟ submissions 
and the extensive record, we conclude that the District Court 
did not err or abuse its discretion.  We agree with the District 
Court.  Substantially for the reasons set forth in that excellent 
opinion, we will affirm the Court‟s judgment as to the 
plaintiffs‟ appeal.   
  
      Plaintiffs also argue on appeal that the District Court erred 
in deferring any determination of an award of attorney‟s fees 
and costs.  We find this remaining argument without merit 
and not in need of a separate discussion.  Accordingly, we 
will affirm the District Court‟s judgment with respect to the 
plaintiffs‟ appeal.  The Court may consider on remand 
plaintiffs‟ attorney‟s fee petition. 
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Carnation testified that there were racial tensions 
within the 7-squad before Moroney assumed control, and that 
Carnation brought the problem to Moroney‟s attention.  
Carnation also complained on numerous occasions to 
Colarulo about racial tensions in the 7-squad.  When things 
did not change, Carnation told Colarulo that he thought 
Moroney was condoning racism within the squad by failing to 
address the issue.  Carnation also told Moroney that he was 
contributing to the problem by failing to take any action.   
 
Carnation claimed that, after making these complaints, 
he, along with minority officers and other officers who 
complained of racism, was assigned unassisted duty in 
dangerous neighborhoods in unpleasant weather conditions, 
particularly rain and cold. When Carnation reiterated his 
concern that Moroney was condoning racism, Colarulo told 
him that if he made an EEOC complaint, Colarulo would 
make Carnation‟s life “a living nightmare.”  App. at 2022.  
Colarulo ordered Carnation to apologize for making the 
accusations.   
 
Carnation claims that as a result, he suffered extreme 
anxiety and depression, and was placed on restricted duty out 
of the 25th District in May 1998.  Shortly after his transfer, 
on the Friday before Memorial Day weekend, Carnation made 
at least two telephone calls to the 25th District, seeking to 
speak with Moroney.  According to Carnation, Colarulo 
called him back and exclaimed “[w]ho the fuck do you think 
you are calling Sgt. Moroney at the District?”  App. at 2055.  
After a brief discussion, Colarulo ordered Carnation to “not 
call Sgt. Moroney.”  App. 2054  Carnation testified that he 
understood Colarulo to mean that he should not attempt to 
reach Moroney for the rest of that day.   
 
The next day, a Saturday, Carnation called the 25th 
District and spoke with Moroney about his concerns.  On 
Sunday, Carnation called Colarulo, who was off duty, at 
around 8:30 in the morning at his shore house.  Carnation 
testified that he called to inform Colarulo that he had reached 
Moroney and had resolved many of his concerns, but that he 
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still wanted to schedule a meeting among the three of them.  
Colarulo declined the request, telling Carnation that “he 
doesn‟t conduct meetings in that fashion.”  App. at 2030-31.  
Colarulo thereafter served Carnation with disciplinary papers 
for his Memorial Day calls.   
 
Colarulo brought, or “preferred,” against Carnation 
two counts of insubordination, based on his purported 
“refusal to obey proper orders from superior[s]” and “us[e of] 
profane or insulting language to a superior officer,” and one 
count of neglect of duty, based on his alleged “failure to 
comply with any commissioner‟s orders, directives, 
regulations, etc., or any oral or written orders of superiors.”  
App. at 3527-31.  Colarulo recommended that the matter be 
adjudicated by the Police Board of Inquiry (“PBI”).   
 
Colarulo testified at trial as to the process for bringing 
charges against officers in 1998 and 1999.  He stated that he 
would complete an investigation and determine that 
disciplinary action was warranted.  Then, Colarulo would 
submit the charging papers, also known as “18s,”2 to the 
charging unit of the PBI via his chain of command.  Colarulo 
“d[id not] know how many signatures would be required,” but 
stated that whatever the method, “eventually it does go to the 
[PBI].”  App. at 2821.  The 18s against Carnation were signed 
by Colarulo, the Division Commander, the Chief Inspector, 
and the Deputy Commissioner.   
 
Carnation was permitted to either plead guilty and 
waive a hearing, or plead not guilty and request a hearing.  As 
indicated on the 18s, Carnation pled not guilty and requested 
a hearing before the PBI.  Colarulo characterized the 
adjudication arm of the PBI, before which hearings were held, 
as “completely separate” from the charging unit of the PBI.  
App. at 2823.  He characterized the adjudication unit as 
                                              
2The term “18” is short for document number 75-18, 
which gives notice to the charged person of the charges 
against him or her, the basis for the charges, and the action 
being taken.   
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“similar to a military court marshal.”  App. at 2783.  He 
elaborated: 
 
[W]hen a officer is disciplined, they go before 
this board and there‟s always one person of 
the same rank as the officer and then there 
would be a captain and a lieutenant that sits on 
that board as well.  The City will -- or the 
Police Department will present their case.  
The officer will have representation, legal 
representation with them, and they‟re able to 
cross examine, similar to a courtroom, and it‟s 
basically done at the Round House
[3]
 and then, 
after testimony is taken, that three-person 
board will mediate and decide what the 
appropriate finding is, guilty, not guilty, or so 
forth.   
 
App. at 2783. 
 
More concisely, the PBI adjudication unit is “a three-
person panel that listens to the evidence and then decides the 
proper sanction” to recommend.  App. at 2794.  Its authority 
is limited to recommending sanctions.  The power to impose 
sanctions lies with the Commissioner.   
 
Colarulo informed Carnation that the hearing itself 
would be confidential.  The notice to Carnation regarding the 
PBI hearing also informed him that he had the right to 
counsel.  By signing it, Carnation acknowledged that 
Colarulo had advised him of his right to have counsel of 
choice present at the hearing and that the absence of counsel 
would not be a ground for a continuance and would be 
deemed a waiver of the right to counsel‟s presence.   
 
                                              
3The “Round House” is the popular name for the 
headquarters of the Philadelphia Police Department, 
originally from the architectural form of the building.  
Counsel for Carnation explained at oral argument that the 
hearing is held in the basement of the Round House.   
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Although Carnation, like other members of the Police 
Department, is ordinarily represented by the Fraternal Order 
of Police, which serves as the collective bargaining agent for 
Philadelphia police officers, it did not represent him before 
the PBI.  According to Carnation, the Fraternal Order of 
Police declined to represent him at the hearing because it felt 
that the discord was “a big personality conflict.”  App. at 
2061.  Carnation apparently secured private counsel to 
represent him at the PBI hearing, and he testified on his own 
behalf.  Colarulo also testified for the City, in addition to 
other witnesses.     
 
The PBI that considered the charges against Carnation 
consisted of a police officer, a lieutenant, and a captain.  After 
the hearing, which took place about six months after 
Carnation was charged and lasted just over three hours, the 
PBI found Carnation guilty of the charges preferred by 
Colarulo.  Acting within its authority, it also added a charge 
against Carnation for conduct unbecoming an officer, based 
on its finding that Carnation engaged in “[r]epeated violations 
of departmental rules and regulations, and/or any other course 
of conduct indicating that a member has little or no regard for 
his responsibility as a member of the Police Department.”  
Supp. App. at 633.   
 
The PBI did not give Carnation any notice that it was 
contemplating adding a charge after the hearing.
4
  Based on 
the four charges for which it found Carnation guilty, the PBI 
                                              
4
It is unclear from the record, and indeed it was unclear to 
Carnation, what formed the basis of the charge for conduct 
unbecoming an officer.  Carnation testified that he was under 
significant stress at the time and that the initial charges “kind 
of took [him] over the edge.” App. at 2036.  Acknowledging 
to himself that he was “having some type of psychological 
problems,” he admitted himself to a hospital where he was 
diagnosed as homicidal towards Colarulo and as suicidal.  
App. at 2037.  At trial, Carnation seemed to speculate that the 
added charge stemmed from his homicidal tendencies 
diagnosis.  He referred to the charge as one for “tr[ying] to 
kill a commanding officer.”  App. at 2060. 
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recommended Carnation‟s dismissal.  Shortly thereafter, the 
Commissioner gave Carnation notice of the City‟s intent to 
terminate him.   
 
Following the PBI proceedings, which were the 
subject of testimony before the jury at the Title VII trial, the 
jury returned a verdict for all three plaintiffs.  With respect to 
Carnation, the jury found that Carnation had proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that “the discipline he received 
for contacting his supervisors over the Memorial Day 
weekend was motivated by unlawful retaliation for his 
protesting the treatment of African-Americans or filing a 
claim of discrimination.”  App. at 756.  The jury awarded 
Carnation $2,000,000 in compensatory damages, which the 
District Court reduced to $300,000, based on the 
compensatory damages cap of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 
1981a(b)(3)(D).  After an equity hearing on Carnation‟s 
termination, the District Court awarded Carnation $208,781 
back pay, and $46,560 of pre-judgment interest on the back 
pay.  The Court entered a total judgment in favor of Carnation 
in the amount of $555,341, representing the $300,000 in the 
Title VII case in addition to the equity award. 
 
The City moved for judgment as a matter of law and/or 
notwithstanding the verdict on Carnation‟s termination claim.  
It argued that although Carnation was terminated as a result 
of disciplinary proceedings brought by Colarulo, Carnation 
had failed to establish the requisite causal link between his 
termination and Colarulo‟s alleged retaliatory animus because 
the termination recommendation was made by an 
“independent” PBI.  Supp. App. at 536.  The City emphasized 
that the PBI added a charge sua sponte against Carnation and 
that he had not presented any evidence to permit the inference 
that the PBI itself was motivated by retaliatory animus.   
 
 The District Court denied the City‟s motion for 
judgment as a matter of law and/or notwithstanding the 
verdict.  In doing so, the Court evaluated the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Carnation and concluded that the jury 
was entitled to credit Carnation‟s testimony and find that 
Colarulo was motivated by an intent to retaliate against him.  
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With respect to the PBI, the Court determined that the jury 
had no basis upon which it could find that the PBI itself was 
motivated by retaliation.  The Court held, however, that there 
was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could impute to 
the PBI the retaliatory animus of Colarulo.   
 
In so holding, the Court relied on this court‟s decision 
in Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 
286 (3d Cir. 2001), in which we stated that “[u]nder our case 
law, it is sufficient if those exhibiting discriminatory animus 
influenced or participated in the decision to terminate.”  
Applying this test, the District Court in this case noted that 
“[v]ery little testimony was offered at trial by either side 
about the PBI‟s involvement in Carnation‟s termination.”  
McKenna v. City of Phila., Nos. 98-5835, 99-1163, 2010 WL 
2891591, at *26 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2010). 
 
The Court concluded, however, that “[b]ecause the 
events of [Memorial Day] weekend formed the grounds for 
the disciplinary charges against [Carnation] and the 
proceedings before the PBI, a reasonable jury could find that 
Colarulo‟s animus played a substantial role in the ultimate 
decision by the PBI to recommend Carnation‟s termination.”  
Id. at *31.  The City appeals. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331, 1343, and 1367.  This court has jurisdiction under 29 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the denial of judgment as a matter 
of law de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Carnation, the prevailing party.  Acumed LLC v. 
Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 
2009).  This court will reverse only if the record is “critically 
deficient of the minimum quantum of evidence” upon which a 
jury could reasonably base its verdict.  Id. (internal quotation 
omitted). 
 
III. 
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While this case was pending on appeal, the Supreme 
Court decided Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 
(2011), a decision directly relevant to the issues in the City‟s 
cross-appeal.  We directed the parties to file supplemental 
memos on the effect of Staub. 
 
In that case, Vincent Staub sued his former employer, 
respondent Proctor Hospital, under the Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 
(“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq.5  Staub alleged that 
his termination was motivated by Proctor‟s hostility to his 
obligations as a member of the United States Army Reserve, 
which required him to devote a certain number of weeks and 
weekends per year to training.  Specifically, he claimed that 
although the vice president of human resources, who lacked 
such hostility, made the decision to terminate him, her 
decision was influenced by Staub‟s supervisors, who 
possessed enmity to his military obligations.  Id.  at 1190. 
 
The Seventh Circuit characterized Staub‟s claim as a 
“cat‟s paw case,”6 or one in which Staub sought to hold his 
                                              
5
The Supreme Court described USERRA as a statute 
“very similar to Title VII.”  131 S. Ct. at 1191.  USERRA 
provides that “[a]n employer shall be considered to have 
engaged in [prohibited] actions . . . if the person‟s 
membership . . . in the services . . . is a motivating factor in 
the employer‟s action.”  38 U.S.C. § 4311(c).  Likewise, Title 
VII prohibits employment discrimination “because of . . . 
race,” among other grounds, and provides that the 
complaining party establishes an unlawful employment 
practice when it demonstrates that race “was a motivating 
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors 
also motivated the practice.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (m).   
 
6
As explained by the Supreme Court in Staub, the term 
“cat‟s paw” derives from one of Aesop‟s fables.  131 S. Ct. at 
1190 n.1.  In the fable, a mischievous monkey compliments 
his company, a cat, on his abilities and suggests that the cat 
steal the chestnuts that they were watching roast in a fire.  
The naïve cat, flush with the monkey‟s flattery, readily 
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employer liable for the animus of a nondecisionmaker.  Staub 
v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 2009).  Under 
Seventh Circuit precedent, an employer would be held liable 
in such a circumstance only if the nondecisionmaker exerted 
such “singular influence” over the decisionmaker as to make 
the decision no more than a rubber stamp of the 
nondecisionmaker‟s recommendation.  Id.  The 
decisionmaker would not be considered a pawn of the 
nondecisionmaker, however, if he or she conducted an 
independent investigation into the relevant facts before 
rendering the adverse decision.  Id. at 656-57.   
 
Applying this test, the Seventh Circuit observed that 
the vice president of human relations considered Staub‟s past 
employment incidents, in addition to the supervisors‟ 
opinions, before rendering her ultimate decision.   Id. at 659.  
Thus, the court held that a reasonable jury could not have 
concluded that the decision to terminate Staub was a product 
of “blind reliance.”  Id.  Although the decision was influenced 
by the supervisors‟ opinions, it was not “„wholly dependent‟” 
upon them, and thus Proctor was not liable.  Id. (internal 
quotation omitted). 
 
The Supreme Court reversed.   It rejected the “singular 
influence” test and stated that the correct test of employer 
liability was one of proximate cause.  131 S. Ct. at 1194.  The 
Court further found unpersuasive Proctor‟s argument that a 
decisionmaker‟s “independent investigation (and rejection) of 
the employee‟s allegations of discriminatory animus” relieves 
an employer of fault.  Id. at 1193.  It declined to adopt a 
“hard-and-fast rule” that a decisionmaker‟s independent 
investigation would be sufficient to negate the effect of a 
nondecisionmaker‟s discrimination.  Id.  The Court explained: 
 
[I]f the employer‟s investigation results in 
an adverse action for reasons unrelated to 
the supervisor‟s original biased action . . . 
                                                                                                     
obliges.  The cat proceeds to pluck the chestnuts from the 
flames, singeing his paws in the process, while the monkey 
snatches the chestnuts away.  See id.    
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then the employer will not be liable.  But the 
supervisor‟s biased report may remain a 
causal factor if the independent investigation 
takes it into account without determining 
that the adverse action was, apart from the 
supervisor‟s recommendation, entirely 
justified. . . .  The employer is at fault 
because one of its agents committed an 
action based on discriminatory animus that 
was intended to cause, and did in fact cause, 
an adverse employment decision.   
 
Id.
7
 
 
Here, the City argues that, under Staub, the District 
Court‟s decision denying its motion for judgment as a matter 
of law/notwithstanding the verdict must be reversed because 
the hearing before the PBI severed the causal connection 
between Colarulo‟s retaliatory animus and the 
Commissioner‟s ultimate decision to terminate Carnation.8  
                                              
7By the terms of USERRA, it is the employer‟s burden to 
demonstrate that “the action would have been taken in the 
absence of [the employee‟s] membership [in the uniformed 
services].”  38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1).  Similarly, under the 
familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework 
applicable to Title VII cases such as this, if an employee 
establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, “the burden shifts 
to the employer to advance a legitimate, non-retaliatory 
reason for its conduct.”  Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 
331, 342 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted); see 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 
(1973). 
 
8
We note that the City does not contest that the record was 
sufficient to support the jury‟s finding that Colarulo harbored 
retaliatory intent towards Carnation.  Nor could it.  There was 
more than enough evidence to support the jury‟s 
determination in this regard.  The City only challenges the 
conclusion that Colarulo‟s animus may be imputed to the 
14 
 
Essentially, the City contends that Colarulo‟s animus was not 
a proximate cause of Carnation‟s termination because the PBI 
adjudicatory process was an intervening superseding cause.  
We do not agree. 
 
“Proximate cause requires only „some direct relation 
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct 
alleged,‟ and excludes only those „link[s] that are too remote,  
purely contingent, or indirect.‟”  Id. at 1192 (quoting Hemi 
Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, ----, 130 S. Ct. 
983, 989 (2010)).  It is “causation substantial enough and 
close enough to the harm to be recognized by law.”  Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 704 (2004).  “A cause can be 
thought „superseding‟ only if it is a „cause of independent 
origin that was not foreseeable.‟”  Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192 
(quoting Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 
(1996)).    
 
Once Carnation established a prima facie case that his 
termination was motivated by Colarulo‟s retaliatory animus, 
it was the City‟s burden to come forward with evidence                
that it terminated Carnation for reasons unrelated to 
Colarulo‟s original biased action in preferring charges against 
him.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
802 (1973).  As the District Court noted, however, the 
testimony that was offered at trial did not illuminate the 
extent of the PBI‟s role in Carnation‟s termination.  It is not 
clear that Carnation called witnesses on his behalf or cross-
examined Colarulo, even if he could have.
9
  The record does 
not reveal the testimony of the other witnesses for the City or 
if they were cross-examined.  There was no testimony as to 
what the Commissioner saw or relied upon when making the 
                                                                                                     
PBI, which recommended Carnation‟s termination, and the 
Commissioner, who actually terminated Carnation.   
 
9At oral argument, Carnation‟s counsel suggested that 
Carnation did not and could not call any witnesses to testify 
on his behalf because of the general fear of retaliation from 
Colarulo.   
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decision to terminate Carnation.  All that the evidence 
demonstrates is that Colarulo retaliated against Carnation by 
referring the 18s against him, the PBI affirmed those charges, 
and the Commissioner then terminated Carnation.   
 
We agree with the District Court that “the events of 
[Memorial Day] weekend formed the grounds for the 
disciplinary charges against [Carnation] and the proceedings 
before the PBI, [and] a reasonable jury could find that 
Colarulo‟s animus played a substantial role in the ultimate 
decision by the PBI to recommend Carnation‟s termination.”  
McKenna, 2010 WL 2891591, at *31.  In the words of Staub, 
a reasonable jury could conclude that Colarulo‟s animus bore 
a direct and substantial relation to Carnation‟s termination 
and that the PBI‟s recommendation was not independent and 
was foreseeable.  See Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192-93.  See also 
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 703. 
 
We are not convinced by the City‟s arguments to the 
contrary.  The City argues that the fact that the PBI added a 
charge against Carnation demonstrates that the PBI was 
independent.  The jury was entitled to conclude, however, 
that the added charge just as likely reflected that the PBI was 
not independent and that it adopted Colarulo‟s biased account 
of the events.  Notably, the City argued to the jury that the 
PBI “added something that Colarulo hadn‟t even . . .  
introduced, and they made the decision to terminate him.  
[Carnation] was represented by his union that day, and he 
could have challenged that.”  App. at 3064.  The jury found 
this unpersuasive, as do we.   
 
The City also asserts on appeal that the PBI was 
necessarily independent because the hearing was “an 
adversarial fact-finding process accompanied by due process 
protections” that assessed the charges under “quasi-judicial 
scrutiny” and was “designed to elicit a complete airing of the 
facts before an unbiased board.”  Appellee‟s Reply Br. at 4.  
This characterization significantly exaggerates any inferences 
16 
 
that are permissible from the record.
10
  The City argued to the 
jury in its closing that the PBI “was a department process, and 
three independent people who didn‟t know Ray Carnation, 
who weren‟t involved with his other allegations, the 
information was presented to them, and they made the 
decision.”  App. at 3064.  The jury was entitled to find this 
argument unconvincing.   
 
We thus conclude that, under Staub, the District Court 
did not err in denying the City‟s motion for judgment as a 
matter of law/notwithstanding the verdict.   Staub,  however, 
was not the law in effect at the time the jury was instructed or 
at the time that the District Court rendered its decision.  
                                              
10At oral argument, Carnation‟s counsel informed this 
court that Carnation was not entitled to counsel or to review 
the evidence against him before the PBI hearing took place.  
Nor was he permitted to respond to the 18s as they were 
passing through Colarulo‟s chain of command, other than 
check a box to plead not guilty to the charges and request a 
hearing.  Counsel also explained that Carnation‟s right to 
appeal from the PBI‟s ultimate recommendation was narrow.  
And counsel noted that the Commissioner, when deciding 
Carnation‟s punishment, was given a limited record to 
review.  The Commissioner was not presented with the 
transcript of the PBI hearing, but rather was presented with 
“white papers,” which included only the PBI‟s ultimate 
recommendation and Colarulo‟s statements.  None of this was 
made part of the trial record.  If it had been made part of the 
record, it would have only further demonstrated that the PBI 
was not, as the City characterizes it, an “independent 
adjudicatory process . . . involving a hearing with due process 
protections.”  Appellee‟s Br. at 94.  We need not rely on 
counsel‟s statements at argument, however, as the record 
itself is insufficient to demonstrate the PBI‟s independence.  
Even if the City had proven that the PBI was a truly 
independent body, this alone would not undermine the jury‟s 
determination, based on all the evidence, that there was a 
causal connection between Carnation‟s termination and his 
involvement in protected activity. 
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Rather, it was this court‟s decision in Abramson that was 
controlling.  In Abramson, we did not explicitly characterize 
the applicable test as one of proximate cause.  Rather, we 
explained that “it is sufficient if those exhibiting 
discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the 
decision to terminate.”  260 F.3d at 286.  At oral argument, 
the City requested that we remand for a new trial so that the 
jury may be instructed in accordance with Staub if we 
conclude that Carnation prevails thereunder.  
 
After consideration of the City‟s request, we find no 
reason to remand.  The jury was instructed that it was 
Carnation‟s burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he was terminated after engaging in protected 
activity and that there was a causal connection between the 
termination and the protected activity.  As to causation, the 
jury was instructed that “you must decide whether the 
plaintiff‟s protected activity . . . had a determinative effect on 
the alleged materially adverse action.  Determinative effect 
means that if not for the plaintiff‟s protected activity, the 
alleged materially adverse action would not have occurred.”  
App. at 3108. 
 
The instructions to the jury incorporated the concept of 
proximate cause.  Based on these instructions, the jury 
concluded that Colarulo‟s animus caused Carnation‟s 
termination, notwithstanding the intervening hearing before 
the PBI.  The jury could not have reached a different decision 
as a matter of law, even if it had been instructed in 
accordance with Staub.  As explained, there was no evidence 
to support a conclusion that the hearing before the PBI was an 
intervening superseding cause of Carnation‟s termination.   
 
Thus, although the jury instructions did not precisely 
hew to the proximate cause language adopted in Staub, we 
conclude that the variation was harmless.  We will decline to 
remand for a new trial with different instructions. 
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IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court.
11
 
 
                                              
11
The motion of the City of Philadelphia for leave to file a 
Supplemental Appendix is granted. 
